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Organizations develop crisis readiness to avoid and mitigate crises. This study investigates several factors that 
influence crisis readiness, including market dynamism, perceived likelihood of a crisis (PLC), and firm size. It 
also evaluates the impact of crisis readiness on firm performance. Results from a PLS-SEM assessment of 301 
managers in the United States suggest that market dynamism drives firm performance while heightening both 
PLC and crisis readiness. When compared to large organizations, managers in small- and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) reported higher PLC but lower crisis readiness, underscoring the challenges faced by small 
firms regarding crisis preparation. Crisis readiness was also positively linked to both financial and non-financial 
performance. The model tested in this study supports the influence of external and organizational factors on 
crisis preparation, as well as subsequent links with firm performance. 
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The list of companies filing for bankruptcy during the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic is extensive 
and includes such notables as Hertz, Stein Mart, Ruby Tuesday, Virgin Atlantic, and Chesapeake 
Energy. Their struggles can be attributed to numerous factors, including abrupt changes in buyer 
behavior, supply chain interruptions, and government health mandates (Clifford & Wahba, 2020; Shen, 
Fu, Pan, Yu, & Chen, 2020). But other firms avoided this fate, and some even prospered. Whether 
through strategic foresight or good luck, companies that survive and thrive during a crisis are better 
prepared (Bundy, Pfarrer, Short, & Coombs, 2017; Coombs & Holladay, 2006; Crandall, Parnell, & 
Spillan, 2020). However, navigating a crisis begins with developing readiness in the organization 
before a crisis occurs (Bhaduri, 2019; Bowers, Hall, & Srinivasan, 2017; Gallagher, 2017; Okoli & Watt, 
2018).  
Developing crisis readiness is more challenging for some organizations than for others, however. 
Factors that influence this process include a firm’s external environment, idiosyncratic characteristics 
such as organizational size, and perceptions regarding potential threats from a crisis (Joon Mo, 
Mortara, & Minshall, 2018; Topaloglu, Koseoglu, & Ondracek, 2013). Understanding how such factors 
influence crisis readiness in organizations can help explain why gaps in crisis preparation exist across 
firms, and ultimately, what can be done to address them. 
It is difficult to suggest how many companies that succumbed to a crisis would have survived if they 
had been better prepared. A maturing body of scholarship underscores the importance of crisis 
preparation (Bhaduri, 2019; Liu, Shankar, & Yun, 2017; Vouzas & Nizamidou, 2018). This paper focuses 




on two gaps in the literature. First, more research is needed on environmental and organizational 
factors that promote or hamper crisis readiness. Second, most published work examining the 
performance of firms before and after a crisis focus on profitability, revenues, share prices, and other 
financial measures (Dias, Rossi, Silva, de Camargos, & de-Carvalho, 2020; Osiyevskyy, Shirokova, & 
Ritala, 2020; Rababah, Al-Haddad, Sial, Chunmei, & Cherian, 2020; Ryu, Kim, & Ryu, 2019; Shen et al., 
2020). Research addressing the non-financial dimension of performance is also needed (Bouslah, 
Kryzanowski, & M’Zali, 2018; Elbanna, Child, & Dayan, 2013; Parnell, 2015).  
This study focuses on factors that drive crisis readiness, and ultimately, firm performance. It 
addresses two research questions: (1) How do market dynamism, perceived likelihood of a crisis, and 
firm size influence crisis readiness? (2) How does crisis readiness influence financial and non-financial 
firm performance? It contributes to the crisis management literature by examining how crisis readiness 
influences both financial and non-financial dimensions of firm performance. Presenting and evaluating 
an integrated model informs future work and provides practical suggestions for managers seeking to 




A crisis is an unpredictable event that can directly threaten an organization. Examples of crises are 
myriad and include natural disasters, cyber-crime, labor disputes, product recalls, and lawsuits 
emanating from discrimination, sexual harassment, and whistleblowers. Accelerated by increased 
technology and the increasingly global nature of business activity, the frequency and diversity of crises 
have increased in recent years (Boin, 2019; Bundy et al., 2017; Coleman, 2004; Greyser, 2009; 
Jakubanecs, Supphellen, & Helgeson, 2018; Lalonde, 2007; Robert & Lajtha, 2002). Many crisis events 
require quick, decisive action, the ramifications of which can dramatically affect a firm’s reputation, 
financial performance, and even survival (Bundy et al., 2017; Coombs & Holladay, 2006).  
Effective crisis management requires that action be taken before, during, and after a crisis event. 
Avoidable crises should be averted, and others should be managed to mitigate their adverse effects 
on the firm. Toward this end, organizations should develop crisis management capabilities and crisis 
management plans (CMPs) before a crisis occurs (Cirka & Corrigall, 2010; Hunter, Van Wassenhove, & 
Besiou, 2016; Jacques, 2010). Organizations with established crisis management teams (CMTs) and 
CMPs tend to exhibit a greater awareness of and concern for possible crises (Crandall et al., 2020). 
CMTs develop worst-case scenarios and standard operating procedures (SOPs) to anticipate crises and 
to provide guidance to organizational members when a crisis strikes. Moreover, all employees should 
be aware of their specific responsibilities and should be empowered appropriately to manage a crisis 
in their departments (Areiqut & Zamil, 2011).  
Developing crisis readiness in a firm prepares its members to address a crisis proactively and 
navigate it effectively (Okoli & Watt, 2018). Examples underscoring the importance of crisis readiness 
are legion. The following scenario illustrates the link between strategic management and crisis 
management, as well as the specific challenges associated with crisis readiness and decision-making.   
Overbooking has been widely successful in the airline industry, as fewer empty seats translate into 
higher revenues, lower per-seat costs, and lower fares (Klophaus & Pölt, 2006; Parnell & Crandall, 
2017). The practice is readily justified because many ticketed passengers arrive in time to board their 
flights anyway (Carey, 2017). Between 2010 and 2019, the number of passengers denied boarding 
ranged from 352 to 746 annually, 0.079% of the total for the ten-year period. Most of the denials were 
voluntary. The number of passengers removed involuntarily ranged from 11 to 59 each year, only 
0.006% of the total for the same period (U.S. Department of Transportation, 2020).  
Overbooking might make strategic sense, but each boarding denial represents a stressful event 
with the potential to become a crisis. United Airlines experienced a worst-case scenario on April 9, 




2017, when ticketed passenger Dr. David Dao was forcibly removed from a United flight. When Dr. 
Dao’s removal was recorded on a smartphone and posted on social media, a boarding denial had 
rapidly become a significant and costly crisis for the firm (Carey, 2017). Crisis readiness reflects an 
organization’s ability to evaluate the potential effects of a strategic decision such as overbooking and 
prepare for negative scenarios that can occur as a result. While United Airlines had established 
procedures to manage boarding denials, the level of crisis readiness in the organization—specifically, 
the training and preparation afforded the United employees who dealt with Dr. Dao directly—was 
insufficient.  
The United Airlines example illustrates how a firm’s approach to strategic planning can make an 
organization more or less susceptible to a crisis. However, firms must also proactively develop crisis 
readiness (Crandall et al., 2020).  Managers can take important steps to help their organizations 
prepare for a crisis that cannot be avoided (Bhaduri, 2019; Spector, 2019).      
Crisis readiness is a sub-area of the broader discipline of crisis management and includes both signal 
detection and preparation/prevention phases (Bundy et al., 2017; Pearson & Mitroff, 1993). An 
organization’s crisis readiness defines its ability to address crisis events when they occur. Crisis 
readiness should be distinguished from a manager’s perceptions about the likelihood of a crisis (PLC). 
Also referred to as crisis concern, PLC reflects the extent to which managers worry about the 
likelihood of crisis events and the potential impacts they might have on the organization (Pearson & 
Mitroff, 1993).  
Rousaki and Alcott (2007) developed scales to measure crisis readiness and the perceived likelihood 
of a crisis (PLC). Other scholars (e.g., Avery & Park, 2019; Elsubbaugh, Fildes, & Rose, 2004; Enander, 
Hede, & Lajksjö, 2015; Hilliard, Scott-Halsell, & Palakurthi, 2011; Jin, 2010; Labaš, 2017; Olofsson, 2011; 
Selart, Johansen, & Nesse, 2013) have used the term “crisis preparation” within a similar context. Crisis 
preparation and crisis readiness are related constructs. Indeed, preparing an organization for a crisis 
enhances its readiness, but other factors (e.g., access to financial resources) are also important. 
Nonetheless, scholarship on the merits of crisis preparation helps inform a broader understanding of 
crisis readiness. Hence, these terms are used interchangeably in this paper.  
Crisis readiness can be viewed from an internal perspective (Bundy et al., 2017). Research on high-
reliability organizations suggests that firms can modify culture, structure, and design to manage 
unexpected events by preventing breakdowns that can facilitate a crisis (Ashford & Anand, 2003; 
Greve, Palmer, & Pozner, 2010). A firm’s culture can be tolerant of executive misconduct that can lay 
the groundwork for a crisis (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2006).  
Crisis readiness can also be viewed from an external perspective (Bundy et al., 2017). Positive 
stakeholder relationships can increase information exchange and cooperation between managers 
across firms, helping firms avoid crises (Kahn, Barton, & Fellows, 2013; Ulmer, Sellnow, & Seeger, 2011). 
In a similar vein, negative stakeholder relationships can prompt members of an organization to engage 
in unethical or illegal behavior to meet stakeholder expectations or to take necessary action to 
retaliate against a stakeholder (Greve et al., 2010). Uncertainties associated with market dynamism—
perceived instability and constant change in markets in which the firm competes (Rodrigo-Alarcón, 
García-Villaverde, Parra-Requena, & Ruiz-Ortega, 2017; Wu & Nguyen, 2019; Zehir & Balak, 2018)—can 




This paper tests five sets of hypotheses, each of which is tested as part of a composite model linking 
environmental and organizational factors to crisis readiness, and ultimately to firm performance. 
 
 




MARKET DYNAMISM AND PERFORMANCE 
 
Market dynamism reflects the degree of environmental volatility and unpredictability that 
organizations encounter (Wu & Nguyen, 2019; Zehir & Balak, 2018). It propagates market asymmetry 
and creates strategic opportunities for managers to distinguish their firms from rivals, thereby 
potentially increasing firm performance. (H. Liu & H. Wei, 2015; Zhang, 2008). Market dynamism can 
also be an essential precursor to organizational development by facilitating strategic change (Y. Liu & 
H. Wei, 2015). Indeed, firms can leverage the market uncertainty associated with dynamic markets by 
developing new products, entering new markets, integrating supply chains, or taking other strategic 
actions (Xu, Li, Sun, & Zhao, 2012). A broad link between market dynamism and firm performance is 
largely consistent with the resource-based view of the firm, as it underscores the notion of subjective 
value and the unique positions from which organizations address environment uncertainty (Barney, 
2014; Parnell, 2018). 
Increased market dynamism creates opportunities for innovation and high firm performance 
(Antoncic & Hisrich, 2001; Atuahene-Gima, Li, & De Luca, 2006; Rodrigo-Alarcón et al., 2017). 
Specifically, dynamic markets encourage innovation, which can increase returns in highly competitive 
markets (Tsai & Yang, 2013). Previous research supports a substantial nexus between dynamism and 
firm performance (Crandall et al., 2020; Zehir & Balak, 2018). 
 
H1a: Market dynamism will be positively associated with financial performance. 
H1b: Market dynamism will be positively associated with non-financial performance. 
 
MARKET DYNAMISM, PERCEIVED LIKELIHOOD OF A CRISIS AND CRISIS READINESS 
 
Crisis decision-making is complex and challenging because leaders must make quick decisions amidst 
environments of stress, high uncertainty, and turbulence (de Waard, Volberda, & Soeters, 2012; Kantur 
& Iseri-Say, 2012). Indeed, uncertainty often stokes anxiety (Gottlieb, Weiss, & Chapman, 2007; 
Swamidass & Newell, 1987). In this respect, perceived environmental uncertainty can heighten 
awareness of and concern about potential adverse events (Coombs & Laufer, 2018; Jauch & Kraft, 
1986; Milliken, 1987; Parnell, 2018; Watson et al., 2017). Indeed, environmental change is inherent in 
dynamic markets (Antonacopoulou & Sheaffer, 2014; Hunter et al., 2016; Stern, 2013). Higher levels of 
uncertainty characterize such markets. Scholars have highlighted the role of external influences such 
as environmental uncertainty on managerial decision-making (Elbanna et al., 2013; Parnell, 2018). 
Hence, one would expect managers in such environments to report higher levels of both crisis concern 
and crisis readiness. 
 
H2: Market dynamism will be positively associated with a manager’s perceived likelihood of a crisis. 
H3: Market dynamism will be positively associated with crisis readiness. 
 
PERCEIVED LIKELIHOOD OF A CRISIS AND CRISIS READINESS 
 
Crisis concern tends to spark preparation and readiness, as managers aware of current or prospective 
organizational problems are more likely to take appropriate measures to address them. Such a link is 
intuitive, as some level of knowledge about a potential problem is generally required before individuals 
act. Although awareness does not guarantee a positive response, research supports the notion that 
management action tends to increase when the awareness of a crisis or another concern also rises 
(Bruce & Nowlin, 2011; Chew Abdullah & Khairuddin, 2013; Tanifuji, 2000; Wong, 2019). 




There are instances when crisis concern might not enhance crisis readiness or where crisis readiness 
could drive crisis concern (Parnell, Koseoglu, & Spillan, 2010; Rousaki & Alcott, 2007). For example, 
managers could report high crisis concern after considerable crisis preparation has already occurred 
because preparation can raise crisis awareness, particularly among managers who would otherwise 
not be concerned. Nonetheless, previous work suggests a strong link between crisis concern and 
action designed to enhance crisis response (Bundy et al., 2017; Crandall et al., 2020; Liu et al., 2017). 
Hence, a positive link between PLC and crisis readiness is anticipated in this study. 
 
H4: The perceived likelihood of a crisis will be positively associated with crisis readiness. 
 
FIRM SIZE AND CRISIS READINESS 
 
Effective crisis planning requires that organizations commit the appropriate time, energy, and other 
resources (Parnell, 2015). Many large organizations employ individuals assigned to specific crisis 
management activities and work with consultants to integrate advanced crisis assessment and 
training (Bhaduri, 2019; Nicolau, 2015; Watson et al., 2017). Because of inadequate planning and 
resource constraints, smaller organizations often struggle to survive when a crisis strikes. There is less 
scholarly work on crisis planning in SMEs, with exceptions in crisis-prone industries such as hospitality 
and tourism (Herbane, 2013; Morakabati, Page, & Fletcher, 2017; Racherla & Clark, 2009; Sawalha, 
Jraisat, & Al-Quduh, 2013). 
In addition, SMEs often lack the information necessary to anticipate and preclude a crisis, as well 
as the resources required to manage one. Limited economies of scale place SMEs at a relative 
disadvantage because they must spread the costs associated with crisis readiness over fewer units of 
production (Doern, 2016; Kurschus, Sarapovas, & Pilinkiene, 2017; Nicolau, 2015; Vargo & Seville, 2011; 
Vouzas & Nizamidou, 2018). Hence, managers with a general awareness of crisis challenges associated 
with smaller firms will likely report both a greater concern about prospective crises in their 
organizations and a reduced level of crisis readiness. 
 
H5a: Managers in SMEs will report a higher PLC than will managers in large firms. 
H5b: Managers in SMEs will report a lower level of crisis readiness than will managers in large firms. 
 
CRISIS READINESS AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
 
Crisis readiness can enhance financial performance in two primary ways. First, when a firm’s managers 
anticipate and prepare for crisis events, they can reduce the likelihood that one will occur, thereby 
eliminating the loss a crisis can bring to bear. Second, even when a crisis cannot be avoided, CMTs and 
CMPs can help a firm manage it and reduce the negative financial impact on the organization. Extant 
research supports a broad link between crisis preparation and financial outcomes across industries 
(Antonacopoulou & Sheaffer, 2014; Crandall et al., 2020; Elsubbaugh et al., 2004). 
Intuitively, the positive link between crisis readiness and financial performance could extend to the 
non-financial arena (Bouslah et al., 2018). Conceptual support for such a link emanates from 
stakeholder theory, which emphasizes the impacts of firm action on various outcomes (Hillman & 
Keim, 2001). A stakeholder perspective highlights non-financial performance measures alongside the 
traditional concerns of profitability, firm growth, and financial returns to owners. Moreover, some 
crisis events affect non-financial performance directly. For example, a social media crisis can 
immediately damage a firm's reputation and customer goodwill, even if the financial implications are 
minimized or cannot be readily calculated (Cheng, 2018; Greyser, 2009; Watson & Rodrigues, 2018; 




Zhang & Borden, 2017). Hence, crisis readiness should drive both financial and non-financial 
performance. 
 
H6a: Crisis readiness will be positively associated with financial performance. 




Data were collected via a survey administered online through Cint’s online insight exchange platform. 
Surveys were sent to and completed by full-time, practicing managers in the United States; part-time 
managers and non-managers were excluded. From an initial population of approximately 1,400 
qualified potential respondents, 442 surveys were completed. Multiple management levels, 
experiential backgrounds, industry affiliations, and organization sizes were represented, including 
individuals with a wide range of organizational and management experience (see table 1). Lower level 
and middle managers were included in the analysis, as they have played a more significant role in 
recent years in both strategy formulation and execution (Balogun & Johnson, 2004; Raes, Heijltjes, 
Glunk, & Roe, 2011). 
Small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) were defined as organizations with at least ten but no 
more than 250 employees. Micro-businesses—organizations with fewer than ten employees—were 
excluded from the analysis. Hence, non-SMEs in the study included only organizations with more than 
250 employees. SME status was measured by a dichotomous dummy variable. 
Previously validated scales were employed to the extent feasible. The crisis readiness scale was 
adapted from Rousaki and Alcott (2007), who developed the only existing published scale available to 
measure the construct. The PLC scale was based on their work but modified for the current study.  
The market dynamism scale was adopted from Junghan and Lakshmanan (2015). This scale was 
utilized because of its emphasis on customers (e.g., interest in new products and price sensitivity) and 
its ease of application to firms in various manufacturing and service industries. 
Firm performance was measured via eight items adapted from prior studies (Hult, Hurley, & Knight, 
2004; Tang, Tang, Marino, Zhang, & Li, 2008; Tsai & Yang, 2013; Zahra & Garvis, 2000) and dissected 
into financial and non-financial dimensions. Self-reported performance measures were used because 
of the limited access to financial data for privately held firms, the positive correlation between 
perceived and objective performance measures (Lau & Ngo, 2001; Menguc & Auh, 2006), and the 
preference for relative performance measures when assessing organizations across industries. Seven-
point Likert scales (e.g., 1=strongly disagree, 4=neither disagree nor agree, 7=strongly agree) were 
employed.  
Each response was scrutinized for evidence of straightlining, excessive missing data, and other 
concerns. Individuals completing the survey in less than 2.5 seconds per question were eliminated. This 
conservative approach to cleaning the data eliminated 141 cases, resulting in 301 usable responses.  
The hypotheses were tested via SmartPLS (version 3) software. SmartPLS employs a partial least 
squares (PLS) algorithm to structural equation modeling (SEM). Whereas covariance-based SEM seeks 
to minimize unexplained variance, PLS-SEM seeks to maximize explained variance. SmartPLS was used 
because of its ability to predict target variables (e.g., crisis readiness and firm performance) (Hair, 










Table 1. Sample Demographics 
 n % 
Management Level   
Lower 26 8.6 
Middle 175 58.1 
Upper 100 33.2 
Functional Background   
Accounting/Finance 57 18.9 
General Management/HR 80 26.6 
Law 9 3.0 
Marketing/Sales 30 10.0 
Production/Engineering 73 24.3 
Information Technology 25 8.3 
Other 26 8.0 
(missing) 2 0.7 
Gender   
Male 155 51.5 
Female 143 47.5 
(missing) 3 1.0 
Industry   
Manufacturing 82 27.2 
Hospitality 22 7.3 
Healthcare 30 10.0 
Services 104 34.6 
Other 62 20.6 
(missing) 1 0.3 
Firm Size   
Micro (-10 employees) 0 0.0 
Small (11-50 employees) 55 18.3 
Medium (51-250 employees) 104 34.6 




The hypotheses and model were assessed systematically (Hair et al., 2019). Scales were evaluated for 
reliability and validity with the consistent partial least squares (PLSc) algorithm (see tables 2 & 3). 
Three of the market dynamism items produced loadings below 0.700 and were eliminated in a 
stepwise fashion. All eight of the crisis readiness items loaded above 0.700 and were retained. The 
third item in the PLC scale produced a loading of 0.676, slightly below the target minimum of 0.700. It 
was retained because latent constructs should include at least three measures and loadings tend to 
be lower in three-item scales. Factor-level variance inflation factor (VIF) scores were less than 3.3 in all 
instances (see table 4), suggesting that the model is free from common method bias (Kock, 2015). 
The first and second items in the financial performance scale produced loadings of 0.695 and 0.614, 
respectively. The first item in the non-financial performance scale (i.e., customer satisfaction and 
loyalty) produced a loading of 0.534. It is not uncommon for correlations among performance 




measures to fall short of established thresholds, so these items were retained (Chow & Van Der Stede, 
2006; Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1986).  
 
Table 2. Factor Loadings and Collinearity Statistics 
Variable 
Factor 
Loading VIF Item Wording 
Crisis Readiness    
CR1 0.745 1.830 Accessibility to crisis management resources 
CR2 0.709 2.270 Adequate budget to manage a crisis 
CR3 0.712 2.311 Adequate crisis management plan (CMP) 
CR4 0.759 2.170 I am well informed about crisis response resource/tools 
CR5 0.770 2.028 Crisis management viewed as an organizational goal 
CR6 0.773 2.287 Training to manage a crisis 
CR7 0.714 1.802 Rewards employees for detecting and reporting crisis signs 
CR8 0.783 2.195 Key employees well informed about crisis response resource and tools 
Financial Performance    
FP1 0.695 1.642 Return on assets (ROA) 
FP2 0.614 2.079 Growth in revenue/sales 
FP3 0.869 2.089 Growth in market share 
FP4 0.814 1.820 Growth in stock price and investor returns 
Market Dynamism    
MD1 0.764 1.942 Our customers look for new products all the time 
MD2 0.780 1.984 Sometimes customers are price-sensitive, other times not 
MD3 0.837 1.932 
We see demand for our products and services 




   
NFP1 0.534 1.687 Customer satisfaction and loyalty 
NFP2 0.817 2.162 Employee satisfaction and loyalty 
NFP3 0.856 1.564 Development of capabilities critical to firm success 
Perceived Likelihood of a 
Crisis 
   
PLC1 0.789 1.770 High likelihood of a crisis associated with customers 
PLC2 0.856 1.950 High likelihood of a crisis associated with employees 
PLC3 0.676 1.774 High likelihood of a crisis associated with facilities 
 
 













Crisis Readiness 0.909 0.910 0.909 0.557 
Financial Performance 0.841 0.853 0.839 0.569 
Market Dynamism 0.837 0.838 0.837 0.631 
Non-Financial Performance 0.787 0.821 0.787 0.562 
PLC 0.818 0.829 0.819 0.604 
 










Market Dynamism  1.576 1.687 1.712 1.668 
Crisis Readiness 1.819  1.664 1.969 1.909 
PLC 1.458 1.246  1.482 1.484 
Financial Performance 2.422 2.534 2.239  1.390 
Non-Financial Performance 2.648 2.699 2.435 1.553  
SME 1.054 1.034 1.005 1.055 1.056 
 









Perf. PLC SME 
Crisis Readiness 0.746      
Financial Performance 0.460 0.755     
Market Dynamism 0.574 0.498 0.794    
Non-Financial 
Performance 0.528 0.771 0.536 0.750   
PLC 0.531 0.256 0.406 0.290 0.777  
SME -0.060 -0.032 -0.013 -0.015 0.156 1.000 
 










Crisis Readiness      
Financial Performance 0.460     
Market Dynamism 0.574 0.491    
Non-Financial 
Performance 0.522 0.792 0.531   
PLC 0.528 0.252 0.409 0.283  
















Mean Std. Dev. t-stat. p-value Support 
f2 
value 
H1a: Market Dyn. > 
Fin. Perf. 0.349 0.348 0.098 3.543 0.000* yes 0.116 
H1b: Market Dyn. > 
Non-Fin. Perf. 0.347 0.345 0.098 3.540 0.000* yes 0.113 
H2: Market Dyn. > 
PLC 0.409 0.411 0.078 5.261 0.000* yes 0.207 
H3: Market Dyn. > 
Crisis Readiness 0.419 0.419 0.084 4.984 0.000* yes 0.263 
H4: PLC > Crisis 
Readiness 0.379 0.381 0.083 4.559 0.000* yes 0.210 
H5a: SME > PLC 0.161 0.160 0.058 2.786 0.005* yes 0.032 
H5b: SME > Crisis 
Readiness -0.113 -0.111 0.049 2.305 0.021* yes 0.023 
H6a: Crisis Read. > 
Fin. Perf. 0.260 0.266 0.081 3.215 0.001* yes 0.064 
H6b: Crisis Read. > 
Non-Fin. Perf. 0.329 0.334 0.095 3.452 0.001* yes 0.113 
* significant at .05 level 
 
Table 8. Hypothesized Model Indirect Effects 
Indirect Effect Sample Mean Dev. t-stat. p-value 
Mkt. Dyn. > Crisis Read. > Fin. Perf. 0.109 0.112 0.044 2.491 0.013* 
Mkt. Dyn. > Crisis Read. > Non-Fin. Perf. 0.138 0.141 0.051 2.710 0.007* 
Mkt. Dyn. > PLC > Crisis Read. 0.155 0.158 0.049 3.149 0.002* 
Mkt. Dyn. > PLC > Crisis Read. > Fin. 
Perf. 0.040 0.043 0.020 2.035 0.042* 
Mkt. Dyn. > PLC > Crisis Read. > Non-
Fin. Perf. 0.051 0.053 0.023 2.211 0.027* 
PLC > Crisis Read. > Fin. Perf. 0.099 0.101 0.039 2.538 0.011* 
PLC > Crisis Read. > Non-Fin. Perf. 0.125 0.128 0.047 2.652 0.008* 
SME > Crisis Read. > Fin. Perf. -0.029 -0.029 0.016 1.866 0.062 
SME > Crisis Read. > Non-Fin. Perf. -0.037 -0.037 0.019 1.945 0.052 
SME > PLC > Crisis Read. 0.061 0.059 0.023 2.629 0.009* 
SME > PLC > Crisis Read. > Fin. Perf. 0.016 0.016 0.008 1.897 0.058 
SME > PLC > Crisis Read. > Non-Fin. 
Perf. 0.020 0.020 0.010 1.977 0.048* 
* significant at .05 level 
 
Coefficient alphas exceeded 0.800, composite alphas exceeded 0.800, and average variance 
explained (AVE) exceeded 0.500 for all constructs (see table 3). The Fornell-Larcker and hererotrait-
monotrait (HTMT) criteria suggest discriminant validity in all instances (see tables 5-6). Variance 
inflation factor (VIF) scores were below three for all items, suggesting that collinearity was not a 
significant concern. These results reinforce earlier decisions to retain several items with marginal 
loadings. 




Hypotheses were tested by consistent bootstrapping. Each hypothesis was supported, as depicted 
in table 7 and figure 1. The indirect effects in the hypothesized model were assessed as well (see table 
8). Results support some, but not all, mediated relationships in the model.  
Although the bootstrapping results support the proposed path model, it is also important to 
evaluate the practical significance of each relationship. Effect sizes were assessed and interpreted 
following Cohen’s benchmarks of 0.02 (small), 0.15 (moderate), and 0.35 (large) (Hair, Sarstedt, Pieper, 
& Ringle, 2012). The influence of firm size (SME) on PLC and crisis readiness were the smallest, 0.023 
and 0.032, respectively. The effects of market dynamism on PLC (0.207) and crisis readiness (0.263) 
were moderate, as was PLC's effect on crisis readiness (0.210). 
 
 
Figure 1. Tests of Hypotheses 
 
R2 and Q2 values are provided in table 9. Crisis readiness produced the highest R2 value (0.448). The 
R2 value for non-financial performance (0.360) was higher than for financial performance (0.294).  
Q2 values were calculated with a blindfolding test with seven iterations (see table 8). Scores ranged 
from 0.091 to 0.205, suggesting small predictive relevance for each of the four dependent variables in 
the model.  
The PLSpredict algorithm with ten folds and ten repetitions was applied to provide an out-of-
sample evaluation of the predictive model. RMSE calculations were lower for the PLS model than for 
the linear model (LM) in all but one instance (PLC3), supporting predictive power for the tested model 











Table 9. R2 and Q2 Values 
Variable R2 value Q2 value 
Crisis Readiness 0.448 0.205 
Financial Performance 0.294 0.138 
Non-Financial Performance 0.360 0.173 
PLC 0.192 0.091 
 
Table 10. PLSpredict Results 
Item PLS RMSE 
PLS 





oif1 1.222 0.140 1.231 0.128 -0.009 
oif2 1.182 0.144 1.187 0.137 -0.005 
oif3 1.138 0.140 1.133 0.149 0.005 
oif4 1.259 0.136 1.272 0.118 -0.013 
oif5 1.239 0.179 1.246 0.171 -0.007 
oif6 1.256 0.124 1.268 0.107 -0.012 
oif7 1.264 0.148 1.274 0.135 -0.010 
oif8 1.187 0.156 1.194 0.146 -0.007 
perform1 1.160 0.111 1.173 0.090 -0.013 
perform2 1.188 0.033 1.193 0.024 -0.005 
perform3 1.170 0.142 1.179 0.129 -0.009 
perform4 1.159 0.149 1.161 0.146 -0.002 
perform6 1.186 0.058 1.198 0.038 -0.012 
perform7 1.285 0.134 1.299 0.115 -0.014 
perform8 1.042 0.188 1.048 0.178 -0.006 
plc1 1.517 0.094 1.526 0.083 -0.009 
plc2 1.466 0.089 1.473 0.081 -0.007 
plc3 1.550 0.082 1.557 0.074 -0.007 
 
Table 11. Saturated Model 
Hyothesis Link Sample Mean Dev. t-stat. p-value value 
H1a: Mkt. Dyn. > Fin. Perf. 0.354 0.353 0.099 3.558 0.000* 0.116 
H1b: Mkt. Dyn. > Non-Fin. Perf. 0.352 0.348 0.100 3.553 0.000* 0.127 
H2a: Mkt. Dyn. > PLC 0.408 0.411 0.078 5.264 0.000* 0.206 
H2b: Mkt. Dyn. > Crisis Readiness 0.419 0.420 0.084 5.003 0.000* 0.264 
H3: PLC > Crisis Readiness 0.379 0.380 0.081 4.688 0.000* 0.211 
H4a: SME > PLC 0.161 0.161 0.059 2.749 0.006* 0.032 
H4b: SME > Crisis Readiness -0.113 -0.111 0.049 2.300 0.021* 0.023 
H5a: Crisis Read. > Fin. Perf. 0.274 0.282 0.097 2.833 0.005* 0.059 
H5b: Crisis Read. > Non-Fin. Perf. 0.349 0.359 0.106 3.279 0.001* 0.105 
n/a: PLC > Fin. Perf. -0.032 -0.034 0.089 0.359 0.719 0.001 
n/a: PLC > Non-Fin. Perf. -0.041 -0.043 0.077 0.530 0.596 0.002 
n/a: SME > Fin. Perf. -0.006 -0.005 0.058 0.104 0.917 0.000 
n/a: SME > Non-Fin. Perf. 0.016 0.018 0.057 0.286 0.775 0.000 
* significant at .05 level 
 
 




A model including each of the hypothesized links was compared to a saturated model, but only the 
hypothesized links were supported in the latter (see table 11). The Bayesian information criteria (BIC) 
calculations for financial and non-financial performance were lower in the hypothesized model than in 
the saturated model, -88.522 and -118.059 versus -77.461 and -107.198, respectively, thereby supporting 




An importance-performance map analysis (IPMA) assessed the practical implications of the tested 
model. Values in the first four columns in table 12 represent the importance values for each of the four 
target constructs in the model. Values in the final column represent performance values for each 
construct. The IPMA maps are presented later in this section. 
The uncertainty inherent in dynamic markets appears to raise crisis concerns and readiness while 
also promoting firm performance. The IPMA results presented in figure 2 identified market dynamism 
as the most important driver of both financial and non-financial performance. On the surface, 
organizations appear to have no control over market dynamism, but this is not entirely true. Firms 
ultimately choose the markets in which they compete (Parnell, Lester, Zhang, & Köseoglu, 2012; Zajac 
& Shortell, 1989). 
 
 
Figure 2. IPMA Results: Financial Performance 
 










Crisis Readiness  0.258 0.318  72.968 
Financial Performance     69.157 
Market Dynamism 0.446 0.372 0.403 0.398 70.848 
Non-Fin. Performance     73.403 
PLC 0.263 0.068 0.084  67.731 
SME -0.105 -0.207 -0.033 0.394 52.824 
 




The findings reinforce the idea that firms often benefit from the turbulence and uncertainty 
inherent in dynamic markets. In contrast, when managers pursue “safety” in less dynamic sectors, 
they can limit the performance possibilities. 
 
 




Figure 4. IPMA Results: Crisis Readiness 
 
Crisis readiness was the second-most important driver of both financial and non-financial 
performance, as depicted in figure 3. Previous studies reported similar links, but they only assessed 
the financial dimension of performance (Antonacopoulou & Sheaffer, 2014; Elsubbaugh et al., 2004). 
However, the link between crisis readiness and non-financial performance produced higher R2 and Q2 
values than the link between crisis readiness and financial performance. This distinction suggests that 
crisis readiness could have an underappreciated positive influence on customers, employees, and 
other stakeholders.  





Figure 5. IPMA Results: Perceived Likelihood of a Crisis (PLC) 
 
 
Figure 6. IPMA Results for Indicators: Perceived Likelihood of a Crisis (PLC) 
 
The investments required to improve crisis readiness vary across organizations, but forming a CMT, 
developing a CMP, and taking other basic measures can provide clear performance benefits. 
Nonetheless, crisis readiness is relatively more expensive in SMEs because preparation costs must be 
allocated to fewer units of production (Kurschus et al., 2017; Vargo & Seville, 2011). This challenge is 
not only intuitive but is also supported by the findings presented herein.  
Market dynamism was also the most important driver of crisis readiness and PLC, as depicted in 
figures 4 and 5. Nonetheless, the strong link between PLC and crisis readiness reinforces the intuitive 
notion and previous work suggesting that management awareness of and expectations about 
prospective crisis events drives efforts to prepare for those events (Bruce & Nowlin, 2011; Chew 
Abdullah & Khairuddin, 2013; Tanifuji, 2000; Wong, 2019).  
Given that PLC also mediated the market dynamism-crisis readiness relationship (see table 7), many 
firms appear to develop crisis readiness capabilities because they see a crisis as a viable threat, 




particularly in the markets in which they operate. This link also suggests that managers in less dynamic 
markets underestimate and do not prepare sufficiently for crises in their organizations. Firms in 
dynamic markets might be more likely to experience a crisis, but all organizations are susceptible and 
should prepare accordingly (Ali & Al-Aali, 2016; Bundy et al., 2017).   
The PLC-crisis readiness nexus among SMEs depicted in figure 5 is intriguing. Direct and indirect 
results suggest that PLC partially mediates the link between SME status and crisis readiness, but that 
SME status negatively influences crisis readiness directly. Hence, managers in SMEs expressed greater 
concern about prospective crises in their organizations while also reporting a lower degree of crisis 
readiness, reinforcing the resource dependence of crisis preparation efforts. As firms grow, their 
managers tend to become better informed about potential crises and better equipped to prepare for 
them. Although the effect sizes for the SME links were small, SMEs appear to experience the greatest 
crisis vulnerability.  
IPMA maps the indicators of each construct are summarized in table 11. The three items in the 
market dynamism scale were the most important indicators in the assessments with financial 
performance, non-financial performance, and crisis readiness as target constructs. As figure 6 
illustrates, when PLC was evaluated as a target variable, SME was the most important, but also the 




The link between PLC and crisis readiness suggests that crisis training should begin with crisis 
awareness. Managers who do not anticipate a crisis are less likely to prepare for one (Ali & Al-Aali, 
2016; Nizamidou, Vouzas, & Gotzamani, 2019). Wide-ranging reports of crises in the business press 
should enhance awareness in a broad sense, but overexposure can lead some managers to associated 
crisis events with other organizations and think that such events are less likely to occur at their 
organizations (Caponecchia, 2010; Parnell & Dent, 2009). The notion that “it can’t happen to us” is 
shortsighted.  
The results presented herein underscore the need for more effective crisis planning among SMEs. 
Managers in SMEs appear to anticipate crises but are not comfortable with their overall level of 
preparation. Innovative SMEs tend to outperform their rivals in dynamic markets (Kraus, Rigtering, 
Hughes, & Hosman, 2012), but the inherent uncertainty can also make SMEs more prone to crises 
(Kurschus et al., 2017; Vargo & Seville, 2011). The strategic challenges faced by SMEs and large firms 
can differ. Hence, crisis training for SMEs is not only vital but should account for challenges unique to 
smaller organizations.   
Effective crisis planning appears to enhance both financial and non-financial performance. 
Managers often resist crisis planning because they do not see a link between the resources required 
and firm performance. There is growing evidence that such resource commitments are worthwhile 
(Helm & Tolsdorf, 2013; Liu et al., 2017; Mansor & KaderAli, 2017).  
The positive link between crisis planning and firm performance depicted herein suggests that 
managers should be more proactive crisis planners. However, this is not always the case. Advocates 
of crisis awareness and planning often find themselves in a precarious position because they champion 
preparation for specific events that are unlikely to occur. If an organization does not experience a 
crisis—at least for a time—crisis preparation might be deemed unnecessary. However, the results can 
be costly or even catastrophic when a firm does not prepare for a crisis (Parnell & Crandall, 2017). In 








CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 
Two interrelated limitations of this study have been identified. First, this study assessed managers in 
multiple industries. Industry-specific factors influence strategic action and performance. Second, self-
typing scales were employed to assess financial and non-financial performance (Ramanujam & 
Venkatraman, 1987; Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1986). This approach is especially appropriate for 
evaluating performance with cross-industry samples because it considers performance relative to 
competitors instead of relying on objective performance data that is driven in part by industry factors 
(McGahan & Porter, 1997). Nonetheless, quantitative measures provide a more traditional and useful 
lens for performance assessment, which can also reduce the influence of common method variance 
(Chang, Van Witteloostuijn, & Eden, 2010; Lindell & Whitney, 2001; Podasakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & 
Podsakoff, 2003).  
Several viable research directions have been identified. First, the results presented in this study are 
based on a sample of US firms and include a limited number of constructs. Additional scholarship on 
global crisis management is warranted (Coombs & Laufer, 2018) and would help evaluate the 
appropriateness of the model presented herein in other nations. Specifically, research that integrates 
the role of innovation, particularly as a mediator in the market dynamism-firm performance 
relationship, is germane. Previous work supports a link (Antoncic & Hisrich, 2001; Atuahene-Gima et 
al., 2006; Parnell, 2015; Rodrigo-Alarcón et al., 2017), but the distinctions between financial and non-
financial performance are not clear. Consideration of crisis self-efficacy would be appropriate as well 
(Park & Avery, 2019). 
Second, the SME links to PLC and crisis readiness were significant in the present study, but the 
effect sizes were small. Additional work is necessary to delineate the influence of firm size on the 
model. Other measures of size (e.g., revenues) may contribute to a more thorough explanation.   
Third, this study examines links between crisis readiness and current performance. Future work 
should consider the extent to which increasing crisis readiness benefits organizations over the long 
term. This distinction is important, as several scholars have delineated. For example, recent research 
on the long-term implications of product recalls suggests that negative effects linger over time, while 
negative long-term effects were mitigated by voluntary recalls and effective crisis communication (Liu 
et al., 2017; Mansor & KaderAli, 2017). Such findings suggest that the short-term performance influence 
of crisis readiness and response approaches might not translate into a long-term impact.  
The short- and long-term effects associated with crisis preparation can influence commitment to 
the process. From a rational perspective, managers discount the value of future benefits associated 
with an action. This phenomenon can present a severe challenge for managers seeking to raise crisis 
awareness in an organization and acquire the resources necessary to engage in crisis preparation 
(Parnell & Crandall, 2016). Hence, additional work that distinguished between short- and long-term 
impacts is germane.  
Fourth, this study treats PLC and crisis readiness as reflective constructs. While item wording and 
loadings support reflective conceptualizations, the development of formative measures could lend 
insight. For example, PLC assesses three broad crisis categories, not specific crises. Similarly, crisis 
readiness assesses the preparation for crises in general, not the preparation for specific crises. 
Reorienting these scales to include a wide variety of potential crises events could produce rich, 
formative measures that more accurately explain how and why some organizations might be 
concerned about and better prepared for some crises, but not others (Bundy et al., 2017; Crandall et 
al., 2020).  
Finally, a refinement of the performance measures is germane. Specifically, the similarity in results 
for both financial and non-financial performance raises questions about the value of assessing each 
performance dimension as a different construct. The reliability and validity measures reported herein 




support the existence of two constructs and modest differences in the model (e.g., higher R2 and Q2 
values for non-financial performance). Still, the results did not suggest any practical differences. 
Bayesian information criteria (BIC) calculations for a model with a composite performance measure 
were lower in the hypothesized model (-123.521) than in the saturated model (-117.826), lending 
support to a more parsimonious, unidimensional conceptualization of firm performance. Goodness-
of-fit comparisons between competing models with one and two dimensions of performance were 
inconclusive and have limited usefulness when comparing PLS models (Henseler & Sarstedt, 2013). 
This challenge could be resolved by reconsidering the construction of financial and non-financial 
performance measures. Like PLC and crisis readiness, this study also treats financial and non-financial 
firm performance as reflective constructs. Including multiple measures in each construct strengthens 
the analysis, and results from the reliability assessments (see table 3) support this approach. However, 
one item in the financial performance scale and two items in the non-financial performance scale 
loaded below 0.70, suggesting that an assessment of additional financial and non-financial items might 
support a more sophisticated conceptualization of firm performance (Cheah, Sarstedt, Ringle, 
Ramayah, & Ting, 2018; Van der Stede, Chow, & Lin, 2006). Models that include two or more formative 
measures or a combination of reflective and formative measures could be readily assessed with higher-
order models. More intricate measures of firm performance could contribute to a more granular 
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